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1. Introduction
The mergers and acquisitions (‘M&A’) environment is a fast-paced, complex world 
where transactions may be arranged in a matter of days and involve large sums 
of money. In 2012, the value of announced M&A activities (involving Singapore 
companies as either acquirers or target companies) reached US$65 billion, based 
on data from Thompson Reuters. The list of high profi le Singapore transactions 
in 2012 included Heineken’s acquisition of Asia Pacifi c Breweries and the battle 
for control of Fraser and Neave. 
This chapter gives an overview of the process of regulating an M&A transaction 
involving a publicly listed target company, with emphasis to the laws and regulatory 
framework. By the time you embark on a course on the law of M&A, you would 
have read foundational courses in contract law, tort law and company law and 
would be familiar with concepts such as using contracts to allocate risks between 
parties, civil liabilities in tort law, corporate governance, directors’ duties and rights 
of shareholders. The law of M&A also deals with securities regulation, including 
the regulation of the transferability of blocks of shares and controlling interests 
in companies. The law of M&A provides excellent opportunities for you to apply 
the concepts that you would have learnt in the foundational courses. 
2. Types of M&A Transactions
If the acquirer chooses to acquire the shares of a target company, there are two 
principal options. One is a general offer for the shares of the target company 
where its accepting shareholders will tender their shares to the acquirer in return 
for the consideration paid by the acquirer which may be cash, securities or a 
mix of both; the second is a scheme of arrangement pursuant to which the target 
company proposes a scheme to its shareholders for the shares to be transferred to 
the acquirer and in return the acquirer will pay the shareholders cash, securities or 
a mix of both. In either option, the end result is that the target company becomes 
a subsidiary of the acquirer. This enables the acquirer to consolidate the fi nancial 
results of the target company with its own. In addition to the above methods, other 
ways to achieve the merger or acquisition in Singapore may include setting up 
a new holding company to acquire both the acquirer and the target company or 
amalgamating the target company into the acquirer so that it ceases to exist as a 
legal entity. 
It is also possible for the M&A transaction to take the form of an acquisition of 
the businesses of the company (rather than shares of the company). An acquisition 
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of business allows the acquirer to pick and choose the businesses, assets or liabilities 
that it wishes to acquire, leaving the balance behind with the target company. 
However, in an acquisition of business, in order to properly transfer the benefi ts 
and obligations of the contracts with third parties to the acquirer, the process is 
more diffi cult. Under contract law, the benefi ts of the contractual arrangements 
may be assigned by the target company to the acquirer, unless there are express 
prohibitions or restrictions within the terms of the contract. Obligations under 
contracts cannot be assigned unless the third parties consent so the acquirer will 
need to approach the third parties for their consent. In contrast, an acquisition of 
shares of the target company does not require the consent of the third parties who 
have contracted with the target company, in the absence of contrary provisions 
in the contracts.
Each method of an M&A transaction (whether by the acquisition of shares 
or businesses) will generally require the approval of target shareholders but the 
threshold of the approval differs. A sale of substantially of all of the assets of the 
target company to the acquirer will require the approval of the majority of the 
shareholders voting at the shareholders’ meeting. A general offer for the shares of 
the company must be conditional, at the minimum, upon more than 50% of the 
acceptances by the shareholders. If the acquirer manages to secure 90% acceptances 
of the shares under the offer, the acquirer may exercise its rights of compulsory 
acquisition of the remaining shares from the dissenting shareholders. A scheme of 
arrangement must be conditional upon a majority in number, representing 75% in 
value present and voting, voting for the scheme. A successful scheme, however, 
will mean that the acquirer acquires 100% of the target company.
3. Regulatory framework
Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers
The regulation of M&A activity of publicly listed companies in Singapore is a 
combination of statutory rules, stock exchange rules and common law. Takeover 
regulation is primarily found in the Singapore Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the 
‘Takeover Code’). The Takeover Code regulates the acquisition of, among other 
things, ordinary shares of public companies. (The Takeover Code is normally not 
concerned with the acquisition of business since it does not amount to obtaining 
control of the company).
The Takeover Code is enforced by the Securities Industry Council (‘SIC’), 
which is made up of representatives of the government, the Monetary Authority 
of Singapore, and the industry. The day-to-day business of the SIC is conducted 
by a professionally staffed full-time Secretariat. 
The Takeover Code contains General Principles, Rules, and detailed notes. 
Nonetheless, the Takeover Code notes that it is impracticable to devise rules in 
suffi cient detail to cover all circumstances that can arise in takeover and merger 
transactions. Accordingly, both the letter and spirit of the Takeover Code must be 
observed, especially in circumstances not explicitly covered by any Rules. 
The parties to a takeover and their advisers are primarily responsible for 
ensuring observance of its provisions. If there appears to be a breach of the Takeover 
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Code, the SIC may summon the suspected offenders to appear before the SIC for 
a hearing, in which every alleged offender will have the opportunity to answer 
allegations and to call witnesses. The Securities and Futures Act provides the SIC 
with powers to investigate any acts of misconduct in relation to or connected with 
a transaction involving a takeover or merger transaction when it has reason to 
believe that any party or any fi nancial adviser is in breach of the Takeover Code. 
In this respect, the SIC is empowered to make inquiries, summon persons to give 
evidence on oath or affi rmation, or to produce any document or material necessary 
for the purpose of the inquiry.
Although the Takeover Code does not have the force of law and does not give 
rise to criminal proceedings, its breach may result in the imposition of sanctions 
by the SIC. Sanctions that the SIC may impose include private reprimands, public 
censure, and, when the breach is fl agrant, further action designed to deprive the 
offender temporarily or permanently of its ability to enjoy the facilities of the 
securities market. SIC may also order compensation to be paid to shareholders or 
former shareholders by persons who have contravened certain provisions of the 
Takeover Code.
One of most important aspects of the Takeover Code relates to the mandatory 
bid rule. The mandatory bid rule is triggered in either of the two situations: (1) If 
any acquirer, either on its own or together with parties acting in concert with it, 
acquires an interest in 30 percent or more of the voting shares of the target company, 
or (2) if such an acquirer holds, either on its own or together with parties acting 
in concert with it, between 30 and 50 percent (both inclusive) of voting shares of 
the target company, and acquires additional voting shares representing more than 
one percent of the voting shares in the target company in any six-month period.
In a case falling within (1) or (2), the acquirer must extend a takeover offer 
for the remaining voting shares of the target company in accordance with the 
provisions of the Takeover Code. An offer for consideration other than cash must, 
subject to certain exceptions, be accompanied by a cash alternative at not less than 
the highest price paid by the acquirer or parties acting in concert with it within the 
preceding six months. The mandatory bid rule allows the remaining shareholders 
to exit the target company at a fair price upon a change of control of the company.
‘Parties acting in concert’ comprise individuals or companies who, pursuant to 
an arrangement or understanding (whether formal or informal), cooperate, through 
the acquisition by any of them of shares in a company, to obtain or consolidate 
effective control of that company. Certain persons are presumed (unless the 
presumption is rebutted) to be acting in concert with each other. They include a 
company and its related and associated companies and companies whose associated 
companies include any of these companies.
Under the Takeover Code, there are two fundamental principles: (i) target 
shareholders should have the freedom to decide whether the offer succeeds; and 
(ii) all target shareholders of the same class must be treated equally. For this reason, 
the target board is prohibited from engaging in any action that frustrates a bona fi de 
offer (except with the approval of shareholders), even if the target board believes 
that the offer under-values the company or that such offer is not in the interests 
of the company. The target company is also prohibited from giving a preferred 
potential acquirer an unfair advantage by furnishing it with information, thereby 
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making it more diffi cult for a less favoured suitor to compete, with the result that 
target shareholders may be deprived of a better offer. No inducement may be given 
to a shareholder, which is not offered equally to other shareholders.
Statutory Shareholding Restrictions in Specifi c Industries
Other statutes relating to particular industries also govern takeover activity in 
Singapore, insofar as they limit or require prior regulatory approval for share 
ownership in companies engaged in those industries. Those industries are generally 
industries perceived to be critical to national interests—for instance, banking, 
fi nance, insurance, and media. These are found in the specifi c legislation, such 
as the Banking Act, Finance Companies Act, Insurance Act and Newspaper and 
Printing Presses Act.
4. Key Process of a Negotiated M&A transaction
Initial Stages of Negotiation
At the transaction planning stage, the acquirer has to assemble its team of key 
executives, legal advisers, fi nancial advisers and reporting accountants. The 
acquirer and its advisers have to determine the appropriate method of M&A 
transaction based on the considerations discussed above. The acquirer also has 
to determine the price and the mode of fi nancing for the bid if there is a cash 
component, and whether to make purchases of shares in advance of the bid. 
Similar to the acquirer, the target company will also assemble its own team of 
key executives, fi nancial advisers, legal advisers and reporting accountants. The 
target company may also commence an auction process in order to obtain the best 
price for its shares or assets.
Due Diligence
As a matter of business strategy, before an offer for a takeover or acquisition is 
formally made, due diligence must be conducted to assist the party contemplating 
the takeover or acquisition in deciding whether or not to make an offer and 
how to structure it. There is no standard method for carrying out due diligence. 
However, the due diligence process is often limited by various legal and regulatory 
restrictions. While potential acquirers seek to fi nd out all they can about the target 
company, there is no obligation imposed on a target company to assist an acquirer 
with its inquiries. If a target company provides information to a potential acquirer, 
the Takeover Code provides that the same information must be provided to any 
other bona fi de acquirer that emerges. The directors of the target company must 
authorise the disclosure and bear in mind that their fi duciary duty is to act in the 
best interests of the target company.
Notably, any disclosure of information in the due diligence process by the target 
company is hampered by the restrictions on disclosure set out in the Singapore 
Exchange listing rules as well as the insider dealing laws and regulations. A listed 
company is subject to continuing disclosure requirements, which require that the 
company must keep the Singapore Exchange, its shareholders, and other holders 
of its listed securities informed of all material information relating to it, and, as a 
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corollary, a listed company cannot provide any information to a person that would 
put this person in a privileged dealing position. Any such disclosure by the target 
company may also give rise to insider dealing concerns under the Securities and 
Futures Act.
Therefore, in a takeover scenario, usually only limited due diligence conducted 
by an acquirer before making a takeover bid for a target company. The acquirer 
will have to rely on information that is publicly available. This may be found in 
the target company’s memorandum and articles of association and other documents 
and fi lings with Singapore Exchange. The listed company will also have to publish 
quarterly fi nancial information and other routine information such as results of 
meetings and dividend details. 
Announcement of the Bid
In a negotiated transaction, the parties will begin their negotiations on the agreement 
implementing the M&A transaction. This agreement, sometimes known as an 
implementation agreement, sets out the structure, terms and conditions of the 
acquisition and the respective obligations of the acquirer and the target directors 
and management during the acquisition process (that is, from the date of signing 
until the date of completion). The terms and conditions vary according to the 
structure, depending on the relevant issues and each party’s negotiating power.
If the offer effected is a voluntary offer (as opposed to a mandatory offer), the 
price of the shares must not be less than the price of the shares paid by the acquirer 
and its concert parties for the three-month period preceding the offer.
The implementation agreement is an important means to allocate risks between 
the parties, particularly between signing and closing (which may occur several 
months later). These risks relate not only to risks of the transaction not completing 
but also include risks relating to the loss of value of the target company during this 
period. Between the time of signing of the implementation agreement and the time 
of completion, the acquirer may fi nd out a number of unpleasant surprises about 
the target such as where the target has to restate its earlier (inaccurate) fi nancial 
statements and it is not as valuable as the acquirer thought it was. There may be 
also events that occur beyond either party’s control which cease to make strategic 
or business sense for the acquirer to continue with the acquisition. For example, 
a credit crisis may occur such that the acquirer has to incur signifi cantly more 
borrowing costs than what it thought was envisaged or terrorist attacks occurred 
and the target company fi nds that its short-term earnings dip sharply. In either 
case, the acquirer may want to walk away from the transaction without having 
to pay any compensation. Even if the target company may have in breach of the 
agreement, if the acquirer is forced to complete and pay the acquisition price, 
suing the target company, which is now its subsidiary, is a pointless exercise. A 
well-drafted implementation agreement should make it clear as to which party 
bears the risks of these occurrences. 
However, against the background of the implementation agreement, the SIC 
is also cautious in allowing the acquirer to terminate a transaction (other than the 
non-fulfi llment of the acceptance condition or a regulatory condition) because 
termination can lead to grave uncertainty in the market. The Takeover Code 
therefore only permits the acquirer to invoke a condition so as to cause the offer to 
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lapse if the circumstances which give rise to the right to invoke the condition are of 
‘material signifi cance’ to the acquirer in the context of the offer, and information 
about the condition is not available from public records or is not known to the 
acquirer before the offer announcement.
Once the implementation agreement is entered into, the parties will publicly 
announce the bid.
Getting the Approvals
After announcement, the parties will obtain all the approvals necessary for the M&A 
transaction to close. Depending on the offer structure, the offer document, and the 
target circular containing a fairness opinion from the independent fi nancial adviser 
and the recommendation of independent directors of the target company will be 
circulated to the target shareholders. The Takeover Code sets out the information 
that must be included in an offer document, including the acquirer’s intentions 
relating to the target company and its employees; disclosure of interests in securities 
held by the acquirer, its directors, or concert parties; fi nancial information about 
the acquirer; and conditions of the offer and any special arrangements. Information 
about any undertakings given by shareholders must be set out in the offer document. 
Generally speaking, the shareholders in the target company must be put in 
possession of all the facts necessary for the formation of an informed judgment 
as to the merits or demerits of the offer. The obligation of the acquirer in these 
respects toward the shareholders of the target company is the same as the acquirer’s 
obligation toward its own shareholders.
The Takeover Code also sets out the information that must be contained in the 
target document to the shareholders. The target document must contain the advice 
of the independent fi nancial adviser of the target company and the recommendation 
of the target company’s directors on the offer. Usually, the recommendation will 
contain advice as to whether the terms of the offer are fair and reasonable and 
whether the shareholders should accept or reject the offer. It must also include 
information on the shareholdings of the target company in the acquirer, the 
shareholdings in the target company and in the acquirer in which the directors 
of the target company are interested, the shareholdings in the target company 
controlled by its independent fi nancial adviser, and whether the target company’s 
directors intend to accept or reject the offer with respect to their own benefi cial 
shareholdings. Information as to certain arrangements affecting directors must 
also be provided in the target document—for instance, details of any agreement 
or arrangement made between any director of the target company and any other 
person in connection with or conditional upon the outcome of the offer. 
Completion
If all the requisite approvals are obtained (including the requisite shareholder 
acceptance or approval) in an offer for the target shares, the acquirer will proceed to 
complete the M&A transaction and pay the consideration to the target shareholders.
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Directors’ Duties in the Course of Takeover 
In addition to the duties under the Takeover Code, directors of acquirers and target 
companies have to be mindful of their duties under the Companies Act and at 
common law to act in the interests of the companies of which they are directors. 
Directors may sometimes use their powers, ostensibly for the purpose which is 
within their legitimate management powers, but in effect to resist a takeover which 
they believe would be damaging to the company. For example, directors may issue 
shares, ostensibly to raise capital of the company, but the real purpose is to resist 
a takeover which they believe would be damaging of the company. It is often 
diffi cult to determine whether such conduct is legitimate or not by reference only 
to the directors’ professed purpose. 
In many instances, the Takeover Code reinforces the position that exists at 
common law. For example, the Takeover Code provides that the directors of an 
acquirer or target should, in advising their shareholders, have regard to the interests 
of shareholders as a whole, and not to their own interests or those derived from 
personal or family relationships. In other instances, the Takeover Code goes further 
than the common law position by preventing the target board from frustrating a 
bona fi de offer in the absence of shareholder approval. When a target company’s 
board of directors has been notifi ed of a bona fi de offer, or after the target’s board 
has reason to believe that a bona fi de offer is imminent, the board cannot, without 
shareholders’ approval, take any steps which could effectively result in either the 
offer being frustrated, or denial of the target shareholders’ opportunity to decide 
on the merits of the offer. The board can only rely on its persuasive power in 
persuading the shareholders as to its recommendations on the offer. 
5. Conclusion
Law of Mergers and Acquisitions is an upper-year elective subject in law schools 
and it assumes that you have a foundational knowledge of contract law, tort law 
and company law. The subject requires you to think critically across these subject 
areas and also securities regulation. Since issues in M&A do not come neatly 
compartmentalised into each area of law, it hones your problem-solving skills. 
The course has an immediate practical value if you do transactional work when 
you qualify as a lawyer. As M&A raise legal issues that will affect strategy, deal 
structure, legal responsibilities and liabilities, an understanding and sensitivity 
to such issues will be valuable even if you choose to become a business leader, 
investment banker, business consultant or entrepreneur and will enhance your 
effectiveness. 

